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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 A 22-count indictment (the “Indictment”) charges that 
from 2006 to 2013 United States Senator Robert Menendez of 
New Jersey solicited and accepted numerous gifts from his 
friend Dr. Salomon Melgen, a Florida-based ophthalmologist. 
In exchange, Senator Menendez allegedly used the power of 
his office to influence, among other things, an enforcement 
action against Dr. Melgen by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and to encourage the State 
Department and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(“Customs”) to intervene on Dr. Melgen’s behalf in a multi-
million dollar contract dispute with the Dominican Republic.  
 Senator Menendez appeals from the denial of his 
motions to dismiss the Indictment. He argues that, as a United 
States Senator, he is protected from prosecution under the 
Speech or Debate Clause of our Constitution. U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 6, cl. 1. Though it states literally that Members of 
Congress “shall not be questioned in any other Place” for 
“any Speech or Debate in either House,” its protections 
extend to “legislative acts” that Members perform. Senator 
Menendez contends that protected acts form the basis of the 
Indictment. He claims also that Count 22 of the Indictment—
which charges him with knowingly or willfully falsifying, 
concealing, or covering up gifts from Dr. Melgen in violation 
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the “Ethics Act”), 5 
U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101-11, and 18 U.S.C. § 1001—must be 
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dismissed because it allows other Branches of Government to 
intrude on Legislative Branch matters (a separation-of-powers 
claim) and was brought in the wrong venue (New Jersey) 
instead of where it belonged (the District of Columbia). We 
conclude that Senator Menendez’s purportedly legislative acts 
are not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause and that the 
Indictment is not otherwise deficient. Thus we affirm. 
I.  Background 
A.  Senator Menendez, Multi-Dosing, and Dr. 
Melgen’s Dispute with CMS 
 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we generally accept as 
true the factual allegations in an indictment. See United States 
v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012). Our statement of 
facts is therefore drawn from the Indictment except where it 
is noted as drawn from evidence in the record. 
 In 2009 CMS suspected that Dr. Melgen had 
overbilled Medicare for $8.9 million from 2007 to 2008 by 
engaging in a prohibited practice known as “multi-dosing.” 
Medicare policy required that each patient receiving the drug 
Lucentis be treated using a separate vial, but Dr. Melgen 
routinely used the extra solution from a single vial (so-called 
“overfill”) to treat multiple patients. Because he was 
reimbursed as if he used a separate vial for each patient, CMS 
believed Dr. Melgen was paid for more vials of the drug than 
he actually used.  
 Before CMS began formal proceedings against Dr. 
Melgen, Senator Menendez instructed his Legislative 
Assistant to call the Doctor about “a Medicare problem we 
need to help him with.” A-105 (Indict. ¶ 148). The Legislative 
Assistant replied that she and the Senator’s Deputy Chief of 
Staff called Dr. Melgen twice and were “looking into how 
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[they could] be helpful.” Id. (Indict. ¶ 149) (alteration in 
original). After CMS formally notified Dr. Melgen that it may 
seek reimbursement for the suspected overbilling, the 
Senator’s Deputy Chief of Staff emailed the Legislative 
Assistant, “I think we have to weigh in on [Dr. Melgen’s] 
behalf . . . to say they can’t make him pay retroactively.” A-
107 (Indict. ¶¶ 158-59).  
 Senator Menendez’s staff continued to work with Dr. 
Melgen’s lobbyist on the CMS dispute and eventually 
arranged for the Senator to speak with Jonathan Blum, the 
then- Acting Principal Deputy Administrator and Director of 
CMS. Before that conversation, an official from the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
wrote Mr. Blum, “We have a bit of a situation with Senator 
Menendez, who is advocating on behalf of a physician friend 
of his in Florida.” A-108 (Indict. ¶ 166). Meanwhile, Senator 
Menendez’s Legislative Assistant drafted “Talking Points” 
for the Senator that, along with statements about policy, 
included statements like “I was contacted by Dr. Melgen 
regarding an audit by First Coast, the Medicare administrative 
contractor in Florida,” and “I am not weighing [in] on how 
you should administer Lucentis, nor on how his specific audit 
should be resolved but rather [am] asking you to consider the 
confusing and unclear policy on this issue and not punish him 
retroactively as a result.” A-108-09 (Indict. ¶ 167). 
Ultimately, the conversation between Senator Menendez and 
Mr. Blum did not resolve Dr. Melgen’s dispute with CMS. 
The following month, after more developments in the case, 
the Senator noted that Dr. Melgen was “still in the non[-] 
litigant stage” and directed his Chief of Staff to “determine 
who has the best juice at CMS and [HHS].” A-109 (Indict. 
¶ 173).  
 Almost three years later, in June 2012, Senator 
Menendez discussed multi-dosing with Marilyn Tavenner, the 
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then-Acting Administrator of CMS. There is some evidence 
in the record suggesting that Senator Menendez and Ms. 
Tavenner met to discuss her nomination to become the 
permanent Administrator of CMS. For example, the Senator’s 
calendar noted that they were meeting about Ms. Tavenner’s 
“nomination before the [Senate] Finance Committee.” A-462. 
However, there is no evidence suggesting that her nomination 
was actually discussed when they met. See A-1313 (Tavenner 
FD-302); A-1254-55 (Martino FD-302). 
 To prepare for the meeting, the Senator met with Dr. 
Melgen’s lobbyist. A handwritten note for Senator Menendez 
mentioned Dr. Melgen and his lobbyist by name and 
reminded the Senator to “[m]ake the larger policy case” to 
Ms. Tavenner. A-1316. On the other side, Mr. Blum alerted 
Ms. Tavenner to Senator Menendez’s interest in Dr. Melgen’s 
case.  
 Once together, Senator Menendez pressed Ms. 
Tavenner about multi-dosing and advocated on behalf of the 
position favorable to Dr. Melgen in his Medicare billing 
dispute with CMS. Contemporaneous notes reported that 
Senator Menendez and Ms. Tavenner discussed CMS’s multi-
dosing policy but made no mention of Dr. Melgen or his case.  
 A follow-up call between Senator Menendez and Ms. 
Tavenner took place a few weeks later. Before the call, Dr. 
Melgen’s lobbyist prepared a memorandum entitled “Talking 
Points: CMS Policy” and shared it with the Senator’s staff, 
who incorporated it into a separate memorandum prepared for 
Senator Menendez. A-114 (Indict. ¶ 201). The latter 
memorandum noted that “[t]he subject of the call [wa]s to 
discuss the issue [of] Medicare reimbursement when a 
physician multi-doses from a single dose vial,” but it also 
made several references to Dr. Melgen’s case, such as 
“[w]e’re talking about payments made in 2007-2008” and 
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“[i]t’s clear that CMS is taking steps to clarify both multi-
dosing from single-dose vials and overfills going forward. 
This is, in effect, admitting that these policies didn’t exist 
before and don’t apply during the 2007-2008 period. 
Therefore they don’t have any bearing on the issue at hand.” 
A-115 (Indict. ¶ 202). To the Government, the “issue at hand” 
was Dr. Melgen. 
 During the call, Ms. Tavenner said CMS would not 
alter its position on multi-dosing and Senator Menendez 
threatened to raise the issue of multi-dosing directly with 
Kathleen Sebelius, the then-Secretary of HHS who oversaw 
CMS. After the call, Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist spoke with one of 
the Senator’s staffers, and the staffer reported to the Senator 
that the lobbyist was “encouraged, but mainly because he’s 
increasingly confident they won’t have a leg to stand on 
should [Dr. Melgen] litigate. But we’re all hopeful it won’t 
come to that.” A-116 (Indict. ¶ 207). The Indictment does not 
allege specifically that Senator Menendez mentioned Dr. 
Melgen by name to Ms. Tavenner. 
 A week later, the scheduler for the then-Majority 
Leader of the Senate, Harry Reid, arranged a meeting among 
Senator Reid, Senator Menendez, and Secretary Sebelius. 
Senator Menendez told his staff that he did not want to tell 
Dr. Melgen about the arrangement “so that I don’t raise 
expectation[s] just in case it falls apart,” A-117 (Indict. 
¶ 210), though the Senator met with Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist 
before the meeting and received a summary of the latest 
developments in Dr. Melgen’s dispute with CMS. At the 
meeting with Secretary Sebelius and Senator Reid, Senator 
Menendez advocated on behalf of Dr. Melgen’s position in 
the Medicare billing dispute, focusing on his specific case and 
asserting unfair treatment of it. Mr. Blum, who accompanied 
the Secretary to the meeting on behalf of CMS, later told the 
FBI he did not recall anyone mentioning Dr. Melgen by 
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name, but said it was clear to him that the Senators were 
talking about Dr. Melgen and that the issue with his billing 
“was an isolated issue as opposed to a general problem.” A-
1136 (Blum FD-302). Senator Reid told the FBI that Dr. 
Melgen’s name probably came up during the meeting because 
his “individual situation was clearly the purpose of the 
meeting and they would have otherwise been speaking in a 
vacuum.” A-1301 (Reid FD-302). Secretary Sebelius told 
Senator Menendez that because Dr. Melgen’s case was in the 
administrative appeals process, she had no power to influence 
the matter.  
B. Senator Menendez, Port Security, and Dr. Melgen’s 
Dispute with the Dominican Republic 
 In February 2012, Dr. Melgen obtained exclusive 
ownership of a contract held by a company in the Dominican 
Republic named ICSSI. The contract gave ICSSI exclusive 
rights to install and operate X-ray imaging equipment in 
Dominican ports for up to 20 years and required all shipping 
containers to be X-rayed at a tariff of up to $90 per container. 
ICSSI and the Dominican Republic disputed the validity of 
the contract and had already begun litigating the issue.  
 The following month, a former Menendez staffer who 
worked for Dr. Melgen requested a phone call with Assistant 
Secretary of State William Brownfield to discuss ICSSI’s 
contract. A State Department official reported to the Assistant 
Secretary that the former staffer “dropped the name of Sen. 
Menendez pretty squarely as having an interest in [the] case.” 
A-98 (Indict. ¶ 119). That former staffer later met with the 
Assistant Secretary and represented that he (the staffer) spoke 
on behalf of “a United States entity involved in a contract 
dispute with the Government of the Dominican Republic 
concerning the screening of shipping containers at Dominican 
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ports.” Id. (Indict. ¶ 120). He referenced New Jersey 
connections to the dispute.  
 Senator Menendez’s Senior Policy Advisor arranged a 
meeting in May 2012 between the Senator and Assistant 
Secretary Brownfield about U.S. policy relating to Dominican 
port security. At the meeting, Senator Menendez advocated 
for Dr. Melgen’s interest in his foreign contract dispute, 
questioning the Assistant Secretary about the dispute and 
expressing dissatisfaction with the State Department’s lack of 
initiative in the case. Assistant Secretary Brownfield later 
summarized the meeting in an email to his staff, noting that 
Senator Menendez “allud[ed] to” a particular company and 
that the Senator threatened to call a hearing if there was no 
solution. A-101 (Indict. ¶ 125).  
 In June 2012, Senator Menendez’s Senior Policy 
Advisor emailed Assistant Secretary Brownfield’s staff for an 
update on the Dominican port issue. A few days later, the 
Assistant Secretary told his staff that Dr. Melgen’s case “is 
the case about which Sen. Menendez threatened to call me to 
testify at an open hearing. I suspect that was a bluff, but he is 
very much interested in its resolution. A reminder that I owe 
the Senator an answer to the question ‘What can we do to 
resolve this matter?’” Id. (Indict. ¶ 129). Assistant Secretary 
Brownfield later forwarded to his staff another email from Dr. 
Melgen’s representative and wrote, “More on [Senator] 
Menendez’[s] favorite DR port contract case.” A-102 (Indict. 
¶ 131).  
 Senator Menendez subsequently directed his Chief 
Counsel to ask Customs about its rumored donation to the 
Dominican Republic of equipment for the monitoring and 
surveillance of shipping containers. The equipment would 
have made it easier for the Dominican Republic to increase 
port security without honoring its disputed contract with 
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ICSSI. The Senator’s Chief Counsel emailed a Customs 
employee the following: 
My boss asked me to call you about this. 
Dominican officials called him stating that there 
is a private company that has a contract with 
[the Department of Homeland Security] to 
provide container shipment 
scanning/monitoring in the [Dominican 
Republic]. Apparently, there is some effort by 
individuals who do not want to increase security 
in the [Dominican Republic] to hold up that 
contract’s fulfillment. These elements (possibly 
criminal) want [Customs] to give the 
government equipment because they believe the 
government use of the equipment will be less 
effective than the outside contractor. My boss is 
concerned that the [Customs] equipment will be 
used for this ulterior purpose and asked that you 
please consider holding off on the delivery of 
any such equipment until you can discuss this 
matter with us[—]he’d like a briefing.  
Id. (Indict. ¶ 133). The employee responded that Customs was 
not providing the Dominican Republic with any such 
equipment and confirmed with Senator Menendez’s Chief 
Counsel that the “private company” referred to was ICSSI. A-
103 (Indict. ¶¶ 139-42). 
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 C.  Senator Menendez’s Financial Disclosures 
 Under the Ethics Act, Senators are required to file with 
the Secretary of the United States Senate in Washington, 
D.C., an annual financial disclosure form reporting, among 
other things, income, gifts, and financial interests from the 
prior calendar year. While Senator Menendez was subject to 
that obligation, Dr. Melgen and his companies allegedly gave 
the Senator reportable gifts, including “private, chartered, and 
first-class commercial flights,” a car service, and hotel stays 
in Paris, France, and Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. A-135 
(Indict. ¶ 272). Senator Menendez did not disclose any 
reportable gifts from Dr. Melgen in his filings during the 
relevant years. The Indictment claims that the Senator 
engaged in conduct “in the district of New Jersey and 
elsewhere” to falsify, conceal, and cover up those allegedly 
reportable gifts. Id. (Indict. ¶ 271). 
 D.  Procedural History 
 In late 2014, two Menendez staffers (one current and 
one former) invoked the privilege conferred by the Speech or 
Debate Clause to withhold testimony before a federal grand 
jury investigating the Senator’s dealings with Dr. Melgen. 
The parties disputed how protective the privilege was, and the 
District Court ultimately granted the Government’s motion to 
compel the staffers’ testimony. On appeal, we ruled that the 
privilege did not necessarily protect Senator Menendez’s 
“informal communications with Executive Branch officials, 
one of whom [(Ms. Tavenner)] was at the time a presidential 
nominee whose nomination was pending before the United 
States Senate.” In re Grand Jury Investig. (Menendez), 608 F. 
App’x 99, 101 (3d Cir. 2015). However, we required 
additional fact-finding to determine if the privilege applied. 
Thus we remanded the matter to the District Court for 
“specific factual findings about the communications 
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implicated by the grand jury questions” and with instructions 
to “separately analyze[]” the “contents and purposes of each 
disputed communication.” Id. On remand, the Government 
presented the disputed evidence through a summary witness 
and the District Court did not rule on the privilege issue 
again. 
 The grand jury decided to charge Senator Menendez 
and Dr. Melgen, and the Indictment issued in April 2015. The 
Senator moved to dismiss on several grounds, including the 
Speech or Debate privilege and, with respect to Count 22 
alleging reporting violations under the Ethics Act, the 
separation of powers among the Branches of Government and 
faulty venue. The District Court denied the motions. It held 
that Senator Menendez failed to prove that the Indictment 
references any legislative acts covered by the Speech or 
Debate Clause. It also ruled that the Ethics Act charge was 
consistent with separation-of-powers constraints and that 
venue was proper in New Jersey.  
Senator Menendez then took this appeal. The 
Government moved to dismiss parts of it for lack of 
jurisdiction, arguing that the District Court’s denial of the 
motion to dismiss for lack of venue was not immediately 
appealable. See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 
F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 2002). We agreed, but because the 
“appropriate mechanism” for reviewing an allegedly 
improper ruling regarding venue in the absence of an 
appealable final order is mandamus, Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, 
Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
denied the Government’s motion and restricted Senator 
Menendez to raising the venue issue only in the form of a 
“request for a petition for a writ of mandamus concerning 
venue,” Order, Dec. 11, 2015. 
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over the Speech or 
Debate Clause issues under the collateral order doctrine. 
United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 288 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Under the specific circumstances here, we have pendent 
appellate jurisdiction over Senator Menendez’s separation-of-
powers claims. See CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott 
Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2004). And we have 
jurisdiction over Senator Menendez’s request for a petition 
for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
II.  Standard of Review 
 “[O]ur standard of review is mixed” for motions to 
dismiss. Huet, 665 F.3d at 594. We review the District 
Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual 
determinations, including its findings about the contents and 
purposes of the acts alleged in the Indictment, for clear error. 
Id. Senator Menendez argues that we should review the 
District Court’s findings de novo as findings of constitutional 
fact, i.e., “a fact whose ‘determination is decisive of 
constitutional rights.’” Zold v. Twp. of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633, 
636 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting N.J. Citizen Action v. Edison 
Twp., 797 F.2d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1986)). But factual 
findings are not subject to plenary review simply because 
they are material to constitutional analyses. Outside the 
unique First Amendment context that requires “independent 
appellate review” of certain factual findings, Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984), we 
review findings of historical fact for clear error even when 
they affect constitutional rights, see Ornelas v. United States, 
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that findings of narrative 
or historical fact related to Fourth Amendment rights are 
reviewed for clear error); see also United States v. Renzi, 651 
F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing for clear error 
a district court’s findings of fact in the context of a motion to 
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dismiss an indictment on Speech or Debate Clause grounds). 
Here the District Court found historical facts, so we will 
review those findings for clear error notwithstanding their 
relevance to the constitutional analysis. 
 Under the clear error standard, reversal of the District 
Court’s factual findings is warranted only when “the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 
United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2015). “[I]f 
the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light 
of the record viewed in its entirety, we will not reverse it even 
if, as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence 
differently.” United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although our 
review at this stage of a prosecution is ordinarily limited to 
the allegations in the Indictment, see United States v. 
DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2000), we can 
consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the Speech 
or Debate Clause applies, see Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. 
Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 The mandamus petition pertaining to Count 22 is 
“subject to a stringent standard of review.” Delalla v. 
Hanover Ins., 660 F.3d 180, 183 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). “[I]n 
order to grant mandamus relief, ‘an appellate court must find 
a clear legal error calling for relief that can be obtained 
through no other means.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d 
Cir. 1983)). In other words, that relief is “appropriate only 
upon a showing of (1) a clear abuse of discretion or clear 
error of law; (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate 
relief; and (3) a likelihood of irreparable injury.” United 
States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 146 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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III.  Discussion 
 A.  The Speech or Debate Clause 
 To repeat, the Speech or Debate Clause provides that 
“for any Speech or Debate in either House” Members of 
Congress “shall not be questioned in any other Place.” U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The “central role” of the Clause is to 
“prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.” In re 
Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 952 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 
(1975)). It was “not written into the Constitution simply for 
the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but 
to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring 
the independence of individual legislators.” United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972); see also Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (stating that legislators 
must be “immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge 
of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but 
for the public good”).  
 The Supreme Court has read the Clause “broadly” to 
guarantee Members of Congress immunity from criminal or 
civil liability based on their legislative acts, Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972), and to create a privilege 
against the use of “evidence of a legislative act” in a 
prosecution or before a grand jury, United States v. Helstoski, 
442 U.S. 477, 487 (1979); see Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622. But 
because the privilege “was designed to preserve legislative 
independence, not supremacy,” invocations of it that go 
“beyond what is needed to protect legislative independence” 
must be “closely scrutinized.” Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
U.S. 111, 126-27 (1979). More specifically, “the Speech or 
Debate Clause must be read broadly to effect[] its purpose of 
protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no 
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more than the statutes we apply . . . was its purpose to make 
Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal 
responsibility.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516. A Member seeking 
to invoke the Clause’s protections bears “the burden of 
establishing the applicability of legislative immunity . . . by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” Lee, 775 F.2d at 524 (citing 
In re Grand Jury Investig. (Eilberg), 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d 
Cir. 1978)). 
 In practice, the Speech or Debate privilege affords 
protection from indictment only for “legislative activity.” 
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; see also United States v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966); United States v. Helstoski, 635 
F.2d 200, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1980). Legislative acts have 
“consistently been defined as [those] generally done in 
Congress in relation to the business before it.” Brewster, 408 
U.S. at 512. They do not include “all things in any way 
related to the legislative process.” Id. at 516; see Gravel, 408 
U.S. at 625 (“That Senators generally perform certain acts in 
their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make 
all such acts legislative in nature.”). The takeaway is that 
“[t]he Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize every 
official act performed by a member of Congress.” McDade, 
28 F.3d at 295. Rather, it protects only acts that are “an 
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes 
by which Members participate in committee and House 
proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or 
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction 
of either House.” Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.  
 This plays out in a two-step framework for identifying 
legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
First, we look to the form of the act to determine whether it is 
inherently legislative or non-legislative. Some acts are “so 
clearly legislative in nature that no further examination has to 
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be made to determine their appropriate status.” Lee, 775 F.2d 
at 522. Examples of “manifestly legislative acts” include 
introducing and voting on proposed resolutions and 
legislation, introducing evidence and interrogating witnesses 
during committee hearings, subpoenaing records for 
committee hearings, inserting material into the Congressional 
Record, and delivering a speech in Congress. See id. (listing 
cases). And even though “such manifestly legislative acts 
may have been pursued and accomplished for illegitimate 
purposes, such as personal gain, the acts themselves [are] 
obviously legislative in nature.” Id. Thus “an unworthy 
purpose” does not eliminate Speech or Debate protection. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377); 
see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508 (“Our cases make clear 
that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we 
do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it.”); 
Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 840-41 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding without any “consideration[] of intent and 
motive” that a legislator’s appropriation of state funds was 
legislative activity).  
 On the other side of the spectrum, some acts are so 
clearly non-legislative that no inquiry into their content or 
underlying motivation or purpose is needed to classify them. 
Examples include legitimate constituent services such as “the 
making of appointments with Government agencies, 
assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing so-
called ‘news letters’ to constituents, news releases, and 
speeches delivered outside the Congress,” Brewster, 408 U.S. 
at 512, and, of course, illegitimate activities such as accepting 
bribes in exchange for taking official action, id. at 526. Even 
if these non-legislative acts involve policy or relate to 
protected legislative activity, they are not protected. See 
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130-33 (holding that newsletters and 
press releases are outside the scope of the Speech or Debate 
Clause even if they address matters of legislative 
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importance); see also Brewster, 408 U.S. at 515 (“In no case 
has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all 
conduct relating to the legislative process.”).  
 If an act is neither manifestly legislative nor clearly 
non-legislative, then it is ambiguously legislative, and we 
proceed to the second step of the Speech or Debate analysis. 
There we consider the content, purpose, and motive of the act 
to assess its legislative or non-legislative character. See Lee, 
775 F.2d at 522-24. Ambiguously legislative acts—including 
trips by legislators and informal1 contacts with the Executive 
Branch—will be protected or unprotected based on their 
particular circumstances. See id. at 524. In Lee, for example, a 
legislator from the Virgin Islands faced criminal charges for a 
trip he took supposedly on the Government’s behalf. He 
argued that legislative immunity barred the prosecution 
because he engaged in legislative fact-finding during the trip. 
We first explained that there was nothing inherently 
legislative or non-legislative about the trip because it was 
only legislative to the extent it “involved legislative fact-
finding.” Id. at 522. Rather, “[i]t is the content of Lee’s 
private conversations, and not the mere fact that the 
conversations took place, that determines whether Lee is 
entitled to legislative immunity.” Id. We then determined that 
Lee’s conversations were not “in fact . . . legislative in nature 
so as to trigger the immunity.” Id. To reach that conclusion, 
we considered “the content of Lee’s private conversations” 
and his “purpose or motive” for engaging in them. Id. at 522-
24. 
                                              
 1 We use the word “informal” to exclude manifestly 
legislative acts, such as communications with Executive 
Branch officials during committee hearings or the passage of 
legislation, that are protected even if they influence or coerce 
the Executive Branch. 
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 Senator Menendez proposes two alternative standards 
for distinguishing between legislative and non-legislative acts 
at step two. He first argues that an ambiguously legislative act 
should be “viewed objectively and, if it appears legislative, 
that should end the inquiry with the privilege upheld.” 
Menendez Br. at 33. But Lee expressly rejected the view that 
Speech or Debate immunity “protects not only legislative 
acts, but also acts which are purportedly or apparently 
legislative in nature.” 775 F.2d at 522 (emphasis in original). 
Rather, we consider a legislator’s purpose and motive to the 
extent they bear on whether “certain legislative acts were in 
fact taken” or whether “non-legislative acts [are being] 
misrepresented as legislative” in order to invoke the Speech 
or Debate privilege improperly. Id. at 524. Only after we 
conclude that an act is in fact legislative must we refrain from 
inquiring into a legislator’s purpose or motive. Id. Lee’s 
holding is not limited to after-the-fact characterizations of 
acts as legislative, as Senator Menendez contends, nor does it 
suggest that the privilege prevents us from considering 
evidence of a purportedly legislative act’s true character.  
 The authority Senator Menendez cites to the contrary 
misses the mark. He cites a statement in United States v. 
McDade for the principle that it is inappropriate to consider a 
legislator’s motives when determining the character of an 
ambiguously legislative act. McDade considered whether the 
Speech or Debate Clause protected a Congressman’s two 
ambiguously legislative letters, one that “openly lobbie[d]” 
the Executive Branch on behalf of a particular business in his 
district and one that discussed a “broader policy question” 
without “explicitly refer[ring] to any particular business.” 28 
F.3d at 300. Though the McDade Court suggested that the 
second letter “appear[ed] on its face” to be ambiguously 
legislative, it resolved the case without deciding whether the 
letters were legislative activity within the scope of the Clause. 
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Id. The statement is thus a dictum, neither binding on us nor 
even a conclusive determination of the relevant legal issue.  
 Senator Menendez next cites three distinguishable 
cases from other circuits. Two involve manifestly legislative 
activity rather than ambiguously legislative activity that might 
appear legislative on its face. See United States v. Dowdy, 479 
F.2d 213, 224-26 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that actions 
pursuant to an investigation authorized by the Chairman of 
the House Subcommittee on Investigations were legislative 
notwithstanding evidence that the investigation was 
performed in exchange for a bribe); McSurely v. McClellan, 
553 F.2d 1277, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(holding that a Congressman’s actions pursuant to an 
officially sanctioned Congressional investigation would be 
legislative notwithstanding evidence of impure motive, but 
noting that his inquiry into private matters beyond the scope 
of the investigation were not); see also Lee, 775 F.2d at 524 
(treating Dowdy as limited to cases involving “admittedly” 
legislative activity). And the third case is consistent with Lee 
because it allows the Government to inquire into the reasons 
for apparently legislative activity. See United States v. Biaggi, 
853 F.2d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 1988) (ruling that the Government 
may properly present arguments about the “non[-]legislative 
reasons” for the defendant’s purportedly legislative act); see 
also id. at 104 (“The fact that one of the purposes of the travel 
may have been the conduct of legislative activity does not 
preclude a conviction.”). We therefore reject Senator 
Menendez’s first argument that the Speech or Debate Clause 
necessarily protects apparently legislative activity. Courts 
may dig down to discern if it should be deemed legislative or 
non-legislative. 
 Senator Menendez’s second alternative posits that the 
Speech or Debate privilege protects any effort by a Member 
to oversee the Executive Branch, including informal efforts to 
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influence it. See Menendez Br. at 14-18, 19 & n.5; see also 
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136 (Stewart, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). That blanket approach is much too 
broad, as it would immunize many illegal acts that have only 
dubious ties to the legislative process. Like all acts by 
Members, oversight activities exist along a spectrum: the 
Speech or Debate protection is obvious at the edges where 
they are manifestly legislative or clearly non-legislative, but it 
is not obvious in the middle ground where they are 
ambiguously legislative and consideration of their content, 
purpose, and motive is necessary. See McDade, 28 F.3d at 
299-300. Senator Menendez’s informal communications with 
Executive Branch officials are ambiguously legislative, so 
this case is fought on that middle ground, and claims of 
“oversight” do not automatically result in Speech or Debate 
protection.  
 The Government takes a much harder line: it argues 
that the Speech or Debate “protection does not extend to 
Legislative attempts to influence Executive actions, as those 
actions are the domain of the Executive.” Gov’t Br. at 24. 
Though it concedes that the Clause protects formal efforts to 
encourage or command the Executive Branch to do 
something (e.g., by “voting for a resolution,” “preparing 
investigative reports,” “addressing a congressional 
committee,” or “speaking before the legislative body in 
session”), id. at 23 (quoting Youngblood, 352 F.3d at 840), it 
nonetheless contends that any other attempts to influence the 
Executive Branch are categorically outside the scope of the 
immunity, see id. at 25 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause does 
not apply to efforts by members of Congress to influence the 
Executive Branch.” (quoting McDade 28 F.3d at 299)).  
 We disagree with the Government’s all-encompassing 
position. Consistent with our two-step approach to Speech or 
Debate privilege determinations, informal efforts to influence 
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the Executive Branch are ambiguously legislative in nature 
and therefore may (or may not) be protected legislative acts 
depending on their content, purpose, and motive. In general, 
efforts by legislators to “cajole” and “exhort” Executive 
Branch officials “with respect to the administration of a 
federal statute” are not protected. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. 
They include efforts to intervene in decisions pending before 
the Executive Branch that would mainly affect one particular 
party. See McDade, 28 F.3d at 300; see also Menendez Br. at 
20 (distinguishing protected oversight from unprotected 
oversight based on “whether the Member was simply 
assisting a particular person or was addressing a broader 
policy question” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But 
informal attempts to influence the Executive Branch on 
policy, for actual legislative purposes, may qualify as “true 
legislative oversight” and merit Speech or Debate immunity. 
McDade, 28 F.3d at 304 (Scirica, J., concurring); see In re 
Grand Jury Investig. (Menendez), 608 F. App’x at 100 
(noting that “informal oversight” is not necessarily protected, 
but may be in some cases even though it is “not manifestly 
legislative”). Like all inquiries into ambiguously legislative 
acts, that distinction will turn on the content, purpose, and 
motive of the communications at issue. The consequence of 
accepting the Government’s position would be to place 
legitimate policy-based efforts under the specter of possible 
indictment.  
 Senator Menendez does not prevail, however, because 
the acts alleged in this case were essentially lobbying on 
behalf of a particular party and thus, under the specific 
circumstances here, are outside the constitutional safe harbor. 
He claims that the Indictment improperly references five 
supposedly legislative acts: (1) his meeting with Ms. 
Tavenner; (2) his follow-up call with her; (3) his meeting 
with Secretary Sebelius; (4) his meeting with Assistant 
Secretary Brownfield; and (5) his staff’s communications 
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with Customs employees. Senator Menendez’s opening brief 
suggests that the District Court erred in its treatment of 
several other acts alleged in the Indictment, but he specifies in 
his reply brief that he is challenging only these five acts on 
appeal.2 The District Court found that these acts were 
informal attempts to influence the Executive Branch 
specifically on Dr. Melgen’s behalf and not on broader issues 
of policy. See, e.g., A-20 (“[Senator] Menendez fails to meet 
his burden to demonstrate that the primary goal of these 
communications was not to lobby the Executive Branch to 
enforce Dr. Melgen’s specific contract, a non-legislative 
activity.”); A-21 (“The Court finds that Senator Menendez 
does not meet his burden to establish that the predominant 
purpose of these emails was to gather information for a 
legislative purpose rather than to lobby for a postponement of 
                                              
2 For example, he argued that a meeting he attended 
between Dr. Melgen and Senator Tom Harkin, the then-Chair 
of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee, was protected legislative fact-finding. But even 
there, evidence suggests that Senator Menendez was not 
engaged in legislative fact-finding, but rather that he and Dr. 
Melgen sought Senator Harkin’s assistance with Dr. Melgen’s 
particular CMS dispute. See, e.g., A-1152-53 (Harkin FD-
302) (“[Senator] Harkin believes [Senator] Menendez asked 
him to meet with [Dr.] Melgen because [Dr.] Melgen had a 
problem that needed to be addressed.”); A-112 (Indict. ¶ 186) 
(alleging that an email from a Menendez staffer to Senator 
Harkin’s Chief of Staff mentioned Dr. Melgen’s CMS 
dispute). Hence the District Court’s finding that the meeting 
was an attempt to assist Dr. Melgen specifically was not 
clearly erroneous, and the meeting was unprotected by the 
Speech or Debate privilege.  
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planned official action.”). Unless those findings were clearly 
erroneous, they require us to hold that the challenged acts are 
not legislative and that the Speech or Debate privilege does 
not apply to them. And for the reasons that follow, clear error 
is not evident.  
 Senator Menendez argues that the five challenged acts 
were legislative because they addressed questions of policy. 
He relies primarily on allegations from the Indictment and 
evidence in the record showing that each of the challenged 
acts involved policy discussions. See, e.g., A-114 (Indict. 
¶ 200) (“[Senator] Menendez pressed [Ms. Tavenner] about 
multi-dosing and Medicare payments, and advocated on 
behalf of the position favorable to [Dr.] Melgen.” (emphases 
added)); A-116 (Indict. ¶ 204) (alleging that the follow-up 
call with Ms. Tavenner addressed CMS’s “position regarding 
billing” and its decision to “follow[] the CDC guidelines”); 
A-99-100 (Indict. ¶ 123) (alleging that Senator Menendez 
requested a meeting with Assistant Secretary Brownfield “to 
talk about DR (cargo from [Dominican Republic] coming into 
US ports)”); A-1314 (Tavenner FD-302) (reporting that Ms. 
Tavenner’s follow-up call with Senator Menendez addressed 
“the policy regarding billing for vials”); A-1135 (Blum FD-
302) (reporting that the “focus of the conversation” at the 
Sebelius meeting was “the policy,” and that Senator 
Menendez and Senator Reid told Secretary Sebelius they 
“were not there to talk about a particular case; they were there 
to talk about policy”); A-1306 (Sebelius FD-302) (reporting 
that Senator Menendez and Senator Reid spoke “broadly 
about . . . healthcare providers”). He also points to allegations 
and evidence suggesting that Dr. Melgen was not mentioned 
by name in the supposedly protected communications. See, 
e.g., A-101 (Indict. ¶ 125) (alleging that the “issue of a US 
company” doing business in the Dominican Republic was 
only “allud[ed] to” at the Brownfield meeting); Menendez Br. 
at 41 (“No participant stated that [Dr.] Melgen or his case was 
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mentioned.”); id. at 45 (“[N]obody could recall Dr. Melgen’s 
name being mentioned.”); Menendez Reply Br. at 24 (“[T]he 
Indictment does not allege th[e] email [to Customs] identified 
[Dr.] Melgen or his company.” (emphasis in original)). In 
light of these observations, Senator Menendez asserts that the 
District Court clearly erred when it found that the challenged 
acts were informal attempts to influence the Executive 
Branch specifically on Dr. Melgen’s behalf and not on 
broader issues of policy.  
 But the existence of evidence to support an alternative 
finding—that Senator Menendez was concerned with broader 
issues of policy—does not mean that the District Court’s 
findings are clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). For there is much to confirm 
that the District Court’s “account of the evidence is plausible 
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. First, 
evidence exists that Dr. Melgen or his case was mentioned 
specifically during each of the challenged acts. See, e.g., A-
1307 (Sebelius FD-302) (reporting that Secretary Sebelius 
told Senator Menendez “the case at issue [(i.e., Dr. Melgen’s 
case)] was no longer within [her] jurisdiction because it was 
in the appeals process” (emphasis added)); A-1301 (Reid FD-
302) (reporting that Dr. Melgen’s name probably came up 
during the Sebelius meeting “because [Dr.] Melgen’s 
individual situation was clearly the purpose of the meeting 
and they would have otherwise been speaking in a vacuum”); 
A-1302 (Reid FD-302) (“[Senator] Reid considered his role 
in setting up the meeting with [Secretary] Sebelius to be 
offering assistance to [Senator] Menendez in order that 
[Senator] Menendez might be able to offer assistance to [Dr.] 
Melgen.”); A-100-02 (Indict. ¶¶ 124-131) (alleging that 
Senator Menendez “questioned [Assistant Secretary 
Brownfield] about the contract dispute between [Dr. Melgen] 
and the Dominican Republic”). The unrebutted allegations of 
the Indictment and evidence in the record further suggest that 
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participants in the challenged acts were aware that their 
policy discussions related specifically to Dr. Melgen. See, 
e.g., A-1313 (Tavenner FD-302) (reporting that Mr. Blum 
told Ms. Tavenner before her meeting with Senator Menendez 
that the Senator was interested in Dr. Melgen’s case); A-118 
(Indict. ¶ 216) (alleging that Senator Menendez “focus[ed] on 
[Dr.] Melgen’s specific case” during the Sebelius meeting and 
“assert[ed] that [Dr.] Melgen was being treated unfairly”); A-
1307 (Sebelius FD-302) (reporting that Secretary Sebelius 
told Senator Menendez at their meeting that she had no power 
to influence Dr. Melgen’s case); A-98 (Indict. ¶ 119) 
(alleging that Assistant Secretary Brownfield was told before 
his meeting with Senator Menendez that the latter “pretty 
squarely” had an “interest” in Dr. Melgen’s case); A-100-02 
(Indict. ¶¶ 124-131) (alleging that, after the Brownfield 
meeting, Assistant Secretary Brownfield referred to Dr. 
Melgen’s case as the one “about which Sen. Menendez 
threatened to call me to testify” and “[Senator] Menendez’[s] 
favorite DR port contract case”).  
 In sum, evidence is plentiful that to most of those 
involved the focal point of the meetings with Executive 
Branch officials was Dr. Melgen. That Senator Menendez 
framed those meetings using the language of policy does not 
entitle them unvaryingly to Speech or Debate protection. 
Rather, for every mention of policy concerns there is 
substantial record support for the District Court’s findings 
that those concerns were instead attempts to help Dr. Melgen. 
The evidence in favor of Senator Menendez will no doubt 
channel forcefully his position at trial, where the burden will 
be on the Government to convince jurors to find in its favor 
beyond a reasonable doubt. But at this stage the burden is on 
Senator Menendez. It was not clear error for the District 
Court to find that the Senator acted primarily for Dr. Melgen. 
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 Second, there is evidence about the preparations for 
the challenged acts suggesting that Dr. Melgen was the 
primary focus of the supposedly protected communications. 
Unrebutted allegations in the Indictment and materials in the 
record suggest that Senator Menendez prepared for the CMS-
related acts with an eye toward Dr. Melgen’s specific 
situation. See, e.g., A-114 (Indict. ¶ 199) (alleging that 
Senator Menendez prepared for the Tavenner meeting by 
speaking with Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist); A-115 (Indict. ¶ 202) 
(alleging that a memo prepared for Senator Menendez in 
advance of the Tavenner call described the “issue at hand” as 
“payments made in 2007-2008,” the same years as Dr. 
Melgen’s purported overbilling); SA-5-8 (email from Dr. 
Melgen’s lobbyist to a Menendez staffer explaining the scope 
of Dr. Melgen’s dispute with CMS in advance of Senator 
Menendez’s follow-up call with Ms. Tavenner); A-117 
(Indict. ¶ 210) (alleging that Senator Menendez did not tell 
Dr. Melgen about the Sebelius meeting so as not to “raise 
[his] expectation[s] just in case it falls apart”). We do not 
accept Senator Menendez’s suggestion that the Speech or 
Debate Clause somehow prevents consideration of relevant 
circumstantial evidence simply because it predated the 
purportedly legislative act. See Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25. 
 Third, there are unrebutted allegations and materials in 
the record suggesting that Dr. Melgen and his lobbyist were 
particularly interested in following up with Senator Menendez 
on all of the challenged acts. See, e.g., A-116 (Indict. ¶ 205) 
(alleging that Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist wrote to a Menendez 
staffer after the Tavenner meeting that he (the lobbyist) was 
“eager to learn how the call went today”); id. (Indict. ¶ 207) 
(alleging that Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist told a Menendez staffer 
that he (the lobbyist) was “hopeful it won’t come to” 
litigation after the Tavenner meeting); A-116-17 (Indict. 
¶ 208) (alleging that Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist asked to be told 
when Ms. Tavenner responded to Senator Menendez because 
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“at some point I have to make a decision whether to 
recommend to [Dr. Melgen] to go to court rather than wait 
any longer. I did not want to take any action until I knew that 
other avenues were shut down”); A-118-19 (Indict. ¶ 217) 
(alleging that Dr. Melgen’s lobbyist asked for “further 
briefing” on the Sebelius meeting). While this could be seen 
as evidence of Dr. Melgen’s interest in the outcome of a 
genuine policy discussion, it could also be viewed as his 
interest in the outcome of casework performed on his behalf. 
Because the record supports both views, the District Court’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous. 
 Fourth, Senator Menendez ignores unfavorable aspects 
of the evidence on which he relies. For example, he cites a 
note that urged him to “[m]ake the larger policy case” at his 
meeting with Ms. Tavenner, but that note also mentioned Dr. 
Melgen and his lobbyist by name. See A-1316. Far from 
showing that that Dr. Melgen was clearly not discussed at the 
meeting, the note suggests that any discussion of policy 
involved Dr. Melgen’s particular case. Similarly, Senator 
Menendez points out that the Indictment alleges only that the 
“DR port issue” was discussed at the Brownfield meeting and 
that the “issue of a US company” doing business in the 
Dominican Republic was only “allud[ed] to.” A-101 (Indict. 
¶ 125). But the source of that quoted language also indicated 
that Assistant Secretary Brownfield promised he would try to 
“leverage a correct . . . decision on the port contract.” A-101 
(Indict. ¶ 125). By not referencing a promise relating 
specifically to “the port contract,” especially when the 
Indictment alleges that Senator Menendez pressed Assistant 
Secretary Brownfield specifically on his inaction with respect 
to Dr. Melgen’s contract dispute, the Senator asks us to 
ignore relevant and material evidence. We do not view the 
record through such a narrow lens.  
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 Record evidence and unrebutted allegations in the 
Indictment cause us to conclude that the District Court did not 
clearly err when it found that the challenged acts were 
informal attempts to influence the Executive Branch toward a 
political resolution of Dr. Melgen’s disputes and not primarily 
concerned with broader issues of policy. Because there is 
substantial support for the District Court’s findings, we lack 
“the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.” United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2011). Those findings support the Court’s conclusion that 
the Senator’s acts were not legislative. Thus the Speech or 
Debate privilege does not apply. 
 Senator Menendez also advances two alternative 
grounds for claiming that some of the challenged acts are 
protected by Speech or Debate immunity. First, he argues that 
he used the meeting and follow-up call with Ms. Tavenner to 
vet her as the President’s nominee to become the permanent 
CMS Administrator. He points to some evidence suggesting 
that his interactions with Ms. Tavenner were related to her 
pending nomination, not her role as acting CMS 
Administrator. See A-462 (entry in Senator Menendez’s 
calendar reflecting that the meeting with Ms. Tavenner was 
“re: her nomination before the Finance Committee”); A-323 
(grand jury testimony of a Menendez staffer claiming that the 
purpose of the Tavenner meeting was “consideration of her 
nomination”); Menendez Reply Br. at 20 n.11 (arguing that 
the follow-up call, as a continuation of the meeting, was also 
part of the vetting process).  
 But the way that Senator Menendez chooses to 
characterize his actions does not resolve the Speech-or-
Debate-Clause question. See Lee, 775 F.2d at 522. For there 
is evidence in the record suggesting that the meeting and 
follow-up call with Ms. Tavenner were not related to her 
nomination. See, e.g., A-1312-13 (Tavenner FD-302) 
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(reporting that Ms. Tavenner twice requested a meeting with 
Senator Menendez about her confirmation but received no 
response, and she “did not expect her nomination to go 
forward” when she met with Senator Menendez); SA-14 
(email from one Senator Reid staffer to another stating, in the 
same month as the meeting with Ms. Tavenner, that her 
nomination was “dead”); SA-2-4 (interoffice memorandum 
summarizing the Tavenner meeting so Senator Menendez 
could prepare for the follow-up call but never mentioning Ms. 
Tavenner’s nomination); A-116-17 (Indict. ¶¶ 204, 209) 
(alleging that Senator Menendez threatened to take his 
complaints to Secretary Sebelius, implicitly suggesting that 
the complaints were unrelated to Ms. Tavenner’s 
nomination). And, perhaps most telling, Ms. Tavenner told 
the FBI that her “nomination was not mentioned at the 
meeting.” A-1313 (Tavenner FD-302). The District Court 
found that Senator Menendez’s interactions with Ms. 
Tavenner were not related to her confirmation. On this record, 
that finding could hardly be considered clearly wrong; thus 
those interactions are not protected as part of Ms. Tavenner’s 
confirmation process. 
 Second, Senator Menendez argues that his Chief 
Counsel’s correspondence with a Customs employee was 
legislative because it was an attempt to gather information. 
“[F]act-finding, information gathering, and investigative 
activities are essential prerequisites to the drafting of bills and 
the enlightened debate over proposed legislation,” and thus 
they constitute protected legislative acts. Lee, 775 F.2d at 
521. Here, the text of the initial communications with 
Customs appear to request some information from the agency. 
See A-102-03 (Indict. ¶¶ 132-38). But those communications 
also show that Senator Menendez was asking it to refrain 
from donating any equipment to the Dominican Republic 
arguably because this would affect Dr. Melgen’s contract. Id. 
Later communications between Senator Menendez’s staff and 
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Customs confirmed that both parties understood that ICSSI, 
Dr. Melgen’s company, was the entity that would suffer from 
such a donation. See A-103 (Indict. ¶¶ 139-42). Because the 
request for information is so bound up with the advocacy on 
Dr. Melgen’s behalf, it cannot be excised, and the privilege 
turns on the entire communication’s predominant purpose. 
See Lee, 775 F.2d at 525; Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 488 n.7. The 
unrebutted allegations in the Indictment support the District 
Court’s finding that it was not the primary purpose of the 
Customs communications to gather information in support of 
future legislation or to engage in policy-based oversight. Thus 
the District Court’s finding falls well short of clear error, and 
the communications were not protected.  
 In sum, the materials before us provide a sufficient 
basis for the District Court’s conclusion that the predominant 
purpose of the challenged acts was to pursue a political 
resolution to Dr. Melgen’s disputes and not to discuss broader 
issues of policy, vet a presidential nominee, or engage in 
informal information gathering for legislation. It was not to 
engage in true legislative oversight or otherwise influence 
broad matters of policy. No clearly wrong findings exist at 
this stage, and we will affirm the Court’s conclusion that the 
Speech or Debate Clause does not protect any of the 
challenged acts. 
 B.  The Ethics Act 
 The Ethics Act is a wide-ranging statute that, among 
other things, requires Senators to submit certain financial 
disclosure reports each year to the Secretary of the Senate for 
review and public distribution by the Senate’s Select 
Committee on Ethics. Count 22 of the Indictment charges 
Senator Menendez with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(1) 
and (c)(1) by knowingly or willfully falsifying, concealing, or 
covering up the reportable gifts he allegedly received from 
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Dr. Melgen as part of a bribery scheme. Senator Menendez 
advances several arguments as to why Count 22 violates the 
separation of powers among our Branches of Government. 
We reject each. 
 First, Senator Menendez maintains that the Executive 
Branch may not punish any conduct regulated by the Ethics 
Act because the Senate has incorporated it into Senate Rule 
34. Because the Act has been incorporated into the Senate 
Rules, he reasons that its filing requirements stem from the 
Constitution’s Rulemaking Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 
2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”), and their 
violation is punishable only by the Senate as a transgression 
of a Senate Rule. See Menendez Br. at 48 (“Senators are 
compelled to complete these reports only because the Senate 
has exercised its constitutional authority to require them.”). In 
other words, the Ethics Act is unconstitutional as applied to 
the Senate because “the Rulemaking Clause commits the 
power to set and enforce ethical standards for Senators to the 
Senate alone.” Menendez Reply Br. at 28.  
 This contention confuses the relationship between the 
separation of powers, the Ethics Act, and Senate Rule 34. The 
Act, which was passed by the full Congress and signed into 
law by the President, is the source of a Senator’s obligation to 
make financial disclosures. Rule 34 allows the Senate to 
punish Ethics Act violations; it does not undermine the 
Executive Branch’s authority to prosecute a Senator for those 
violations. The separation-of-powers principle does not mean 
that Rule 34 prevents the Executive Branch from enforcing 
the Act, and the Rulemaking Clause does not bar Congress 
from legislating ethics. To say otherwise would immunize 
from prosecution by the Executive Branch any conduct that is 
incorporated into the Senate Rules, however offensive to the 
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laws of the United States. Separation of powers requires no 
such result. Moreover, to the extent the Ethics Act 
incorporates elements of the Senate Rules—such as 
permitting Senators to satisfy their Ethics Act obligations on 
forms created by the Senate, see 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 106(b)(7), 
or creating a defense to the Act’s liability for Senators who 
rely in good faith on advisory opinions issued by the Senate 
Select Committee on Ethics, see United States v. Hansen, 772 
F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.)—that is how 
Congress and the President agreed the Act would operate. It is 
not a sign that the source of Senator Menendez’s filing 
obligations is Senate Rule 34 or that the Ethics Act 
criminalizes violations of those Rules as such. 
 Second, Senator Menendez suggests that Count 22 is 
non-justiciable (legalese for incapable of being decided by a 
court) because it requires the Judicial Branch to resolve 
ambiguities in the Senate Rules. The Judicial Branch is 
generally capable of interpreting congressional rules. See 
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) (“It has 
been long settled, of course, that rules of Congress and its 
committees are judicially cognizable.”); United States v. 
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is 
perfectly clear that the Rulemaking Clause is not an absolute 
bar to judicial interpretation of the House Rules.”). Although 
some Senate Rules may be non-justiciable because they are so 
vague that the Judicial Branch would essentially make rules 
for the Senate (and thereby violate the Rulemaking Clause) if 
it tried to interpret them, see Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1306; 
United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), Senator Menendez has not identified any 
particular Senate Rule that would necessarily be interpreted in 
the course of his prosecution, let alone a Senate Rule that is 
so vague as to be non-justiciable.  
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 Third, Senator Menendez argues that his Ethics Act 
disclosures are protected legislative acts under the Speech or 
Debate Clause. But the “[d]isclosure of income from sources 
other than employment by the United States” is not a 
legislative act because it is not “an integral part of the 
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members 
participate in committee and [Senate] proceedings.” United 
States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 849 (2d Cir. 1982). The cases 
from the D.C. Circuit on which the Senator relies neither 
compel us nor convince us to rule that Ethics Act filings are 
legislative acts. Those cases considered only whether the 
Clause gave safe harbor to a Member’s speech in an official 
congressional disciplinary proceeding, not whether it 
protected a Member’s Ethics Act filings. See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ray 
v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Indeed, the 
D.C. Circuit in another case upheld the conviction of a 
Member of Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for concealing 
material facts in an Ethics Act filing. See Hansen, 772 F.2d at 
943 (Scalia, J.). Hence we rule that Ethics Act filings are not 
legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
 C.  Venue for Count 22 
 Senator Menendez asserts that venue for Count 22 is 
proper only in Washington, D.C., where he filed the Ethics 
Act disclosure forms, and New Jersey is thus the wrong place. 
Because the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of venue is 
not immediately appealable, see, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul 
Global, Inc., 300 F.3d at 378, we allowed Senator Menendez 
to raise that issue only as a petition for a writ of mandamus 
ordering that Count 22 be tried in the District of Columbia. 
He chose not to address the issue of mandamus in his opening 
brief, stating only that our review of the venue issue is 
“plenary.” Menendez Br. at 3. “When an issue is not pursued 
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in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.” Travitz v. 
Northeast Dep’t ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 
704, 711 (3d Cir. 1994). That is so here. 
 Even if the issue were not waived, we would deny 
Senator Menendez’s petition. Mandamus is a “drastic remedy 
that a court should grant only in extraordinary circumstances 
in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 
power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 
378 (3d Cir. 2005). Count 22 alleges that Senator Menendez 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 when he concealed or covered up 
material facts in New Jersey before he filed his financial 
disclosures in Washington, D.C. A-135 (Indict. ¶ 271). “At 
the motion to dismiss stage, the District Court had to accept 
as true all allegations in the indictment, regardless of its 
uncertainty as to how the Government would prove those 
elements at trial.” Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 270 n.8. The District 
Court thus did not abuse its discretion or commit a clear error 
of law when it ruled that the allegation was sufficient to 
support trial in the District of New Jersey.3 Additionally, 
Senator Menendez has not shown that facing trial in New 
                                              
3 We shall not consider record evidence at this stage of 
the litigation to assess whether the District Court’s venue 
ruling was an abuse of discretion or clear error. We recognize 
that “venue must be proper for each count of the indictment,” 
United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 2009), and 
the Government ultimately bears the burden of making that 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2002). But “a pretrial 
motion to dismiss an indictment is not a permissible vehicle 
for addressing the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.” 
DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d at 660.  
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Jersey as opposed to the District of Columbia would likely 
cause him irreparable injury or that a post-conviction appeal 
would be an inadequate remedy for the lack of venue. 
V.  Conclusion 
 We are sensitive that a privilege “is of virtually no use 
to the claimant of the privilege if it may only be sustained 
after elaborate judicial inquiry into the circumstances under 
which the act was performed.” Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 339 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). But we also “take seriously the sentiments 
and concerns of the Supreme Court that Members [of 
Congress] are not to be ‘super-citizens’ immune from 
criminal liability or process.” In re Search of Elec. 
Commc’ns, 802 F.3d 516, 531 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516). Senator Menendez’s selective 
reading of the materials in the record does not persuade us 
that the District Court clearly erred in its findings of fact or 
that it incorrectly applied any law. That reading may prevail 
at trial, but at this stage we affirm in all respects. 
